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Abstract
We develop a behavioral asset pricing model in which agents trade in a market with information
friction. Profit-maximizing agents switch between trading strategies in response to dynamic market
conditions. Due to noisy private information about the fundamental value, the agents form different
evaluations about heterogeneous strategies. We exploit a thin set—a small sub-population—to
pointly identify this nonlinear model, and estimate the structural parameters using extended method
of moments. Based on the estimated parameters, the model produces return time series that emulate
the moments of the real data. These results are robust across different sample periods and estimation
methods.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets undergo cycles of booms and busts. Price fluctuations generate profit opportu-
nities for different investment strategies. No single investment strategy can always triumph—they
also experience cycles of gain and loss in response to shifting market environment. It is essential
for profit-seeking investors to choose their strategies according to the dynamic market conditions.
We try to understand, theoretically and empirically, the impact of information friction on strat-
egy switching. Our model follows the common approach in heterogeneous agent models (HAM),
in which an agent selects from multiple investment principles such as the fundamental and tech-
nical trading strategies, while we introduce information friction to generate endogenous switching
between different strategies.
In this model, every agent receives a private signal—an unbiased forecast about the fundamental
value of the risky asset. Given the presence of information dispersion embodied in the realization of
the private signal, the agents conceive different evaluations for the same investment strategy. As a
result, each agent chooses, from a set of investment strategies, the one that maximizes the expected
profit. The agents’ actions reshape the asset price, and the evolutionary environment forces the
agents to revise their subsequent choices in the next period. Such dynamic interaction between the
agents and the asset price induces behavioral heterogeneity among agents and boom-bust cycles in
the financial market.
We formally identify the proposed behavioral model via a thin set—a small subset of the pop-
ulation that reflects some special cases of the model (Khan and Tamer, 2010). We combine the
unconditional moments, which involve the whole sample, with those conditional moments moti-
vated from the thin sets. The two kinds of moments differ in the rates of convergence, so that
the standard asymptotic theory for generalized method of moments (GMM) is not directly applica-
ble. We employ extended method of moments (XMM) (Gagliardini et al., 2011) for estimation and
statistical inference.
Applying XMM to historical observations of the Standard and Poor 500 index (S&P 500), we
estimate and test our structural model in several sample periods. The predicted returns from the
model closely match the real data in terms of the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurto-
sis. Furthermore, we find empirical evidence that supports the evolutionary trading heterogeneity
driven by information dispersion. When the price is relatively close to the fundamental value, an
investment strategy based on the historical price trend is popular in the market. When the asset
is excessively mispriced, however, the agents tend to switch to a fundamental strategy to pursue
higher expected profits; their collective actions gradually drive the price toward the fundamental
value, which corrects the market.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. In terms of modeling, the dynamics in
trading heterogeneity has been modeled by latent boom-burst market states (Chiarella et al., 2012),
real business cycles (Lof, 2012), and switching stochastic processes (Brock and Hommes, 1998). In
particular, Markov transition of discrete regimes is popular in modeling the switching processes, and
finds many empirical applications in the stock market, commodity market and derivative market
(Frijns et al., 2010; Jongen et al., 2012; Ter Ellen et al., 2013; Eichholtz et al., 2015). While these
empirical papers directly model the aggregate time series, they leave unexplained why some agents
switch their strategies but the others do not. Our new model combines He and Zheng (2016)’s mi-
croeconomic mechanism that endogenizes the Markov switching process and Hirshleifer and Thakor
(1992)’s prioritization of profit instead of utility for the agency problem in asset management. Built
on a microeconomic foundation of individual behavior, our theoretical model provides implication
of the aggregate time series.
Econometric identification is the bridge that links the economic structural model and the
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data. Well-known is the difficulty to check identification in nonlinear models (Rothenberg, 1971;
Newey and McFadden, 1994; Komunjer, 2012). Formal identification is largely missing in the lit-
erature of HAM, where nonlinearity is the rule rather than the exception. While following the
convention of HAM, we construct our model with identification in mind. The switching between
the fundamental and technical strategies opens the opportunity for us to scrutinize in “slow motion”
the instant, or the thin set, when the market is overwhelmed by one strategy. When a single strategy
dominates, identification can be easily verified. We explore the thin-set identification and manage
to recover all structural parameters in our model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper that formally analyzes and establishes identification in the literature of structural modeling
of heterogeneous behavior in the financial market.
In terms of estimation methods, existing empirical works of HAM mostly use nonlinear least
squares (Boswijk et al., 2007; Chiarella et al., 2012; Frijns et al., 2010), except that Franke and Westerhoff
(2012) utilize the simulated method of moments (SMM). We derive an explicit formula of the pric-
ing mechanism that implies moment restrictions in closed-form, which simplifies and speeds up
the estimation. XMM is exactly the right bottle opener for a champagne brewed by the thin-set
identification, thanks to the econometricians who crafted it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the information-driven structural
asset pricing model of behavioral heterogeneity. Section 3 discusses identification, data handling,
and estimation. Section 4 reports the empirical findings, and compares them with those based on
alternative approaches. Section 5 concludes the paper. Moreover, we have prepared an Online
Supplement with additional empirical results, extension, implementation, and examples.
2 Information-Based Structural Model
In this section, we summarize the key building blocks of the information-based structural model.
Step-by-step derivation of the model is given in Appendix Section A. A continuum (of measure
one) of agents trade on one risky asset and one risk-free asset. The logarithm of the fundamental
value of the risky asset at period t, denoted as µt, is an exogenous random variable that market
participants cannot interfere. It follows a random walk µt = µt−1 + σµε
µ
t for some σµ > 0, where
εµt is independently and identically distributed across t with mean and variance standardized as
0 and 1, respectively. Let µt = (µt, µt−1, µt−2, . . . , µ0) be the history of the fundamental value.
At the beginning of period t, each agent receives a private signal xit = µt + σxεit, an unbiased
forecast of the fundamental value µt. The noise εit|µt ∼ i.i.d.Λ, where Λ is a strictly increasing
distribution function with the support of the real line, its density symmetric around 0, and the
variance standardized as 1.
Let pt−1 = (pt−1, pt−2, . . . , p0) be the logarithm of the past price. Both pt−1 and µt−1 are
public information for all investors at the beginning of time t. Each agent consults two financial
advisors who conduct fundamental analysis and chartist analysis independently, to which we refer as
f -advisor and c-advisor, respectively. The advisors make forecast according to their own perception
of price movement, which may not be consistent with the true price formation mechanism. The
f -advisor expects the price to respond to the fundamental value. Once she learns the private infor-
mation xit from her client, she updates the expected µt to be
µt−1+αxit
1+α , which is an average of µt−1
and xit weighted by the precision (the inverse of variance), where α = σ
2
µ/σ
2
x measures the precision
of private information relative to public information. Believing in the efficient market hypothesis,
she expects the period-t return to be ασx1+α (εit − δt) , where δt = ((1 + α) pt−1 − µt−1 − αµt) / (ασx).
The f -advisor maximizes the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function and recom-
mends the optimal investment flow qf∗it = η
ασx
1+α (εit − δt) into the risky asset, where η is the trading
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intensity of the fundamental strategy with respect to asset mispricing.
In the meantime, the c-advisor utilizes technical analysis to forecast price movement. Her
strategy is based only on the historical price trend, rather than xit or µ
t−1. Her expected period-t
return is ∆t−1 = pt−1 − preft−1, where preft−1 is the reference price derived from certain technical rules.
Under the same utility function, the c-advisor recommends the optimal investment flow qc∗t = τ∆t−1
into the risky asset, where τ is the trading intensity of the chartist strategy. Unlike qf∗it that varies
with i, for each individual qc∗t is the same.
We focus on the fundamental and technical strategies of bounded rationality out of many alterna-
tives for the following reasons. (i) The two strategies are used commonly in practice (Allen and Taylor,
1990). (ii) Models accounting for such two strategies are powerful in explaining financial market
phenomena such as bubbles and crashes (Lux, 1995; Huang et al., 2010) and providing empirical
specifications that outperform random walk (Chiarella et al., 2012). (iii) Due to resource con-
straints, it is reasonable to prioritize investment strategies with good tracking records, supported
by theoretical or empirical foundations; it is costly to hire a large number of financial advisors
to conduct various analysis. (iv) No evidence suggests that other types of analysis consistently
outperform fundamental and technical analysis in terms of profitability or utility.
Neither strategy is rational in that they ignore how agents’ trading behavior affects the price.
Forming rational expectation is difficult in the current setup due to the uncertainty about the conver-
gence of the price to the fundamental value. It deviates from the rational expectation model, in which
the price must return to its value at the terminal period. The fundamental strategy that utilizes
private information does not always dominate the chartist strategy because the price—determined
by the aggregate action of market participants—may not necessarily reflect the information.
Next, we discuss how the agents select trading strategies. Unlike the financial advisors who care
about utility, the agents seek to maximize their investment profit in excess to the risk-free asset
(Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992).1 Let pifit be the expected profit of the fundamental strategy based
on the information available at the beginning of period t, and pict be that of the chartist strategy.
In our model, we have
pifit = η
(
ασx
1+α (εit − δt)
)2
pict = τ∆
2
t−1.
(1)
An agent chooses the strategy that yields higher expected profit. Due to the constraints on risk
exposure and resources, we assume that every agent adopts one and only one strategy. Investors
are not confident to select strategies that they are unfamiliar with, especially those insufficiently
corroborated by studies or experience. It is therefore reasonable to presume that agents ignore
strategies that are not scrutinized by their financial advisors.
Now we set equal pifit and pi
c
t to solve the threshold signals that make agents indifferent between
the fundamental and the chartist strategy. The quadratic form in (1) yields the lower bound
εmt = δt−ζt−1 and upper bound ε¯Mt = δt+ζt−1, where ζt−1 = 1+αασx
√
τ
η |∆t−1|. The individual choice
of the strategy hinges on the private signal. We assume that the agent will choose the fundamental
strategy when she is indifferent between the two options. When εit ∈ (−∞, εmt ] ∪ [εMt ,∞), the
agent will adopt the fundamental strategy and we call her a fundamentalist. When εit ∈
(
εmt , ε
M
t
)
,
she will take the chartist strategy, and we call her a chartist. Given the distribution of the private
1Allowing the agents to have a different target function from financial advisors highlights the contrast between
practitioners, who adopt straightforward criteria to swiftly respond to market, and researchers, who focus on sophis-
ticated measures of utility. Our main results still hold when agents maximize CARA utility as their financial advisors
do.
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signal, the fraction of chartists is
mt = Λ
(
εMt
)− Λ (εmt ) .
The fraction of fundamentalists is 1−mt. If in addition Λ is unimodal, an application of the Leibniz
integral rule to mt shows that it strictly decreases in |δt| ∈ (0,∞). Since |δt| captures the degree
of mispricing, the fraction of chartists is relatively large (small) when the market is moderately
(excessively) mispriced.
After selecting their preferred strategies at the beginning of period t, all agents place their trading
orders simultaneously to a market maker. Following Lux (1995), we assume that the market maker
adjusts the price according to
pt (θ) = pt−1 + ρDt (θ) ,
where ρ > 0 is the marginal impact of aggregate demand on the asset price, θ = (η, τ, α, σµ) is the
set of the other structural parameters,2 and
Dt (θ) =
ηασx
1 + α
[
ϕ (ε¯mt )− ϕ
(
ε¯Mt
)− (1−mt) δt]+ τmt∆t−1, (2)
is the aggregate demand in the market, where ϕ (a) =
∫ a
−∞ zdΛ (z) is the upper-truncated mean.
According to the model, the stock market return follows
Rt (θ) = pt (θ)− pt−1 = ρDt (θ) . (3)
The above equation characterizes the asset price movements. It will be the key equation for the
empirical estimation.
We apply the market-maker framework, instead of the market-clearing mechanism, because the
former enables the nonlinear model to be analytically tractable over multiple horizons while the
latter does not necessarily yield a solution for the equilibrium price. Venkataraman and Waisburd
(2007) find that the market-maker mechanism performs as well as, if not outperforms, the market-
clearing mechanism in terms of generating the efficient price.
We conclude this section by comparing our model with the Markov regime-switching regression.
The Markov switching model is originated from Hamilton (1989), and has been extended over the
decades (Kim, 1994; Kim and Nelson, 1999), with the latest development endogenizing the latent
state variable (Kim et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2017). Regime-switching models are featured by the
transition probability among discrete states. In contrast, the microeconomic mechanism in our
model dictates the variation of the fraction of agents who adopt either strategy in the dynamic
market environment. On the one hand, our approach preserves the Markov property since Rt (θ)
depends only on
(
pt−1, preft−1, µt, µt−1
)
, which the econometrician directly observes when analyzing
the data, but no other past observations. On the other hand, our approach differs from the Markov
regime-switching regression as we do not directly model the aggregate time series. Instead, the
aggregate market demand is generated by summing up the individual demand. Furthermore, an
agent’s switching between heterogeneous strategies is endogenous, because the threshold of the
strategy choice is implied by the profit maximization problem. In other words, we attempt to
provide a microeconomic foundation for the association between the latent states and the aggregate
time series.
2Since σx = σµ/
√
α, we do not need to include σx into θ given the presence of σµ and α.
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3 Econometric Methodology
A model is judged not only by its microeconomic foundation, but also by its empirical fitness. We
push the model to encounter data in this section. We verify that the structural parameters can be
identified from the distribution of the observable random variables, and then propose an estimation
procedure.
3.1 Thin-Set Identification
The structural model is a description of the data generating process, while the analysis of identifica-
tion bridges the gap between the theoretical model and the observed data. The unobservable noises
in the structural model stem from (εµt , εit), which are independently and identically distributed
across time. As a result, (Rt (θ) = ρDt (θ))
T
t=1 is strictly stationary according to the model.
In reality, the econometrician observes two time series pT and µT . If the observable random
variables are truly generated from the theoretical model, can we uniquely determine the value of
the “deep parameters” (σµ, η, τ, α, ρ) from the joint distribution of
(
pT ,µT
)
? Obviously, σµ can be
directly identified from µT . We narrow down the question to recovering the parameters (η, τ, α, ρ)
by matching the distribution of (Rt (θ))
T
t=1, which comes from the theory, with the distribution of
the observable (Rrt = pt − pt−1)Tt=1, where the superscript “r” stands for “real”. Nevertheless, (η, τ, ρ)
cannot be identified jointly. In view of (2) and (3), if we multiply ρ by a non-zero constant and
divide η and τ by the same constant, the resulting Rt (θ) in (3) remains. Hence we have to normalize
ρ = 1 and discuss the identification of the other three parameters (η, τ, α).
It is well-known that global identification is often difficult in nonlinear models (Rothenberg, 1971;
Newey and McFadden, 1994; Komunjer, 2012). In the literature of HAM, identification of structural
parameters is largely ignored. In this paper, we formally establish point identification for this highly
nonlinear structural model. We take the thin-set identification approach (Khan and Tamer, 2010;
Lewbel, 2016), conditioning on some events that occur on a set of measure zero if the random
variables are continuously distributed.3 The key insight for the point identification is that when the
event
G1 = {∆t−1 = 0}
occurs, the expected return of the chartist strategy becomes zero, and all investors thereby turn to
the fundamental strategy. Conditional on G1, we have ε¯
m
t = ε¯
M
t and mt = 0, and can simplify (3)
as
Rt (θ) = θ1z˜1,t + θ2z˜2,t, (4)
where z˜1t = µt−1−pt−1 and z˜2t = µt−pt−1 are observable, and θ1 = η/ (1 + α) and θ2 = ηα/ (1 + α)
are explicit functions of the deep parameters. As long as the conditional distribution (z˜1t, z˜2t)
∣∣G1
is not perfectly collinear, we can identify θ1 and θ2, and then recover α = θ2/θ1 and η = θ1 + θ2.
The occurrence of G1 highlights the particular instant when the market is overwhelmed by the
fundamental strategy, and the identification of α and η follows.
Once α is identified, we can further condition on another event
G2 =
{
δ˜t (α) = 0
}
where δ˜t (α) = (1 + α) pt−1 − µt−1 − αµt. Under the event G2, we verify in Appendix Section B
3This thin-set identification strategy is not peculiar to our model. In Supplement Section S5, we provide examples
in which thin-set identification can be invoked to establish point identification for other HAM models.
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that (3) becomes
Rt (θ) = ψ (ςt−1) τ∆t−1 = ψ
(√
τ
1 + α
ασx
√
η
|∆t−1|
)
τ∆t−1,
where ψ (a) = 2Λ (a)− 1 is strictly increasing, and non-negative when a ≥ 0.
Taking the expectation operator E [|·| |G2] on both sides of the above equation, we have
E
[|Rt (θ)| ∣∣G2] = τE [ψ(√τ 1 + α
ασx
√
η
|∆t−1|
)
|∆t−1|
∣∣∣∣G2] .
Since (α, σx, η) are already recovered, in the above equation τ is the only known parameter. Because
the right-hand side is monotonically increasing in τ for any τ ≥ 0 as long as ∆t−1 6= 0, the parameter
τ is identified.
The discussion of identification ensures that we can pin down the deep parameters from the
observable time series given sufficiently many observations. We proceed to the estimation strategy.
3.2 Moment Conditions
Recall that Rrt is the real return and Rt (θ) is the return according to the model. If the real data
is truly generated from the structural model, the distribution of (Rrt)
T
t=1 must be the same as the
that of (Rt (θ))
T
t=1. In reality, the structural model is at best a simplification of the real world.
Moment matching is one of the most popular econometric methods to estimate structural models.
We estimate the structural parameter θ by matching moments of the marginal distribution of returns.
First, as σµ is identified from the standard deviation of ε
µ
t , we specify the first moment function
g1t (θ) = (ε
µ
t )
2 − σ2µ,
since E
[
T−1
∑T
t=1 g1t (θ)
]
= E
[
T−1
∑T
t=1 (ε
µ
t )
2
]
− σ2µ = 0. Next, as the two parameters η and α
can be identified given G1, we match the conditional mean and variance. Notice that these two
moments are implied by the thin-set identification, and conditioning on G1 literally means selecting
only the observations such that ∆t−1 = 0. Since ∆t−1 is continuously distributed, the event G1
happens with probability zero. To avoid the problem of too few local observations, we use a kernel
function to assign weights to each observation, as in Smith (2007) and Gospodinov and Otsu (2012).
We assign large weights on observations with small |∆t−1| and small weights on those with large
|∆t−1|. Given an appropriate bandwidth hT , we would have enough observations to guarantee the
estimation consistency at ∆t−1 = 0 asymptotically as T → ∞. Let wG1t (hT ) = φ (∆t−1/hT ) be
the weight of the t-th observation, where hT is the bandwidth and φ (a) = (2pi)
−1/2 exp
(−0.5a2) is
the density function of the standard normal. We construct two Gaussian-kernel-weighted moment
functions
g2t (θ) = w
G1
t (hT ) (R
r
t −Rt (θ))
g3t (θ) = w
G1
t (hT )
((
R˜rt
)2
− R˜2t (θ)
)
,
where R˜rt = R
r
t − T−1
∑T
t=1R
r
t is the demeaned R
r
t, and R˜
2
t (θ) is defined similarly. On the other
hand, the chartist parameter τ is identified conditional on G2. The argument for identification of τ
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conditional on G2 motivates another kernel-weighted moment function
g4t (θ) = w
G2
t (α, hT ) (|Rrt| − |Rt (θ)|) , (5)
where wG2t (α, hT ) = φ
(
δ˜t (α) /hT
)
. We use the same bandwidth hT in w
G1
t (hT ) and w
G2
t (α, hT )
for simplicity.
Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified, the moments
E
[
{gjt (θ)}j=1,...,4
]
= 04×1
pointly identify θ. However, since {gjt (θ)}j=2,3,4 are constructed from a sub-population, they only
use a small fraction of the data. As a consequence, the rates of convergence of the kernel-weighted
sample moments are slower than the usual rate of
√
T , so are the rates of the estimated parameters.
It is desirable to improve the rate of convergence of these parameter estimates by local identification
information.
Following Gagliardini et al. (2011) and Antoine and Renault (2012), we assume local identifi-
cation in the sense of Rothenberg (1971). That is, θ0 is locally identified if there exists an open
neighborhood of θ0 containing no other θ that can generate the same distribution. Local identifica-
tion does not contradict the thin-set identification. Local identification is based on the unconditional
information of the population. The thin-set point identification here, however, relies on the condi-
tioning of two special events that form the sub-population.
Assuming local identification, we further construct four unconditional moments with the whole
sample. Specifically, we match the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the returns:
g5t (θ) = R
r
t −Rt (θ)
g6t (θ) =
(
R˜rt
)2
− R˜2t (θ)
g7t (θ) =
(
R˜rt
)3
− R˜3t (θ)
g8t (θ) =
(
R˜rt
)4
− R˜4t (θ) .
We focus on these moments, thanks to the well-documented stylized facts about financial time
series, i.e., excessive volatility, negative skewness, and fat tail in returns (Cont, 2001). Under local
identification, these unconditional moment functions {gjt (θ)}j=5,...,8 improve asymptotic efficiency
of the estimator.
The construction of the moments gives a clear interpretation of indirect inference (Gourieroux et al.,
1993). While θ is the deep parameter from the structural model, those eight conditional and uncon-
ditional moments consist of a set of reduced-form parameters. The principle of indirect inference
matches the reduced-form parameters from the observable data and the counterparts from the
structural model. Model misspecification can be accommodated by indirect inference, in which the
estimated structural parameter θ is the one that minimizes some distance between the reduced-form
parameter from the real world and that from the economic theoretical model. Even though our styl-
ized fundamentalist-chartist model is certainly a simplistic narrative, the estimation will tune the
model to its best approximation to the features of the observed return time series.
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3.3 Estimation: XMM
The standard theory of GMM requires that all moments converge at rate
√
T . Such a premise is
violated if we combine the eight moments E [gjt (θ)], j = 1, . . . , 8. The unconditional moments and
conditional ones converge to their population means at different rates. Let gt (θ) = (gjt (θ))j=1,...,8
be the vector of the moment functions. Evaluated at a neighborhood of the true value, the (scaled)
sample unconditional moments T−1/2
∑T
t=1 gjt (θ) = Op (1) for j ∈ {1, 5, . . . , 8}, while the (scaled)
sample conditional moments (ThT )
−1/2∑T
t=1 gjt (θ) /
∑T
t=1 w
G1
t (hT ) = Op (1) for j ∈ {2, 3} and
(ThT )
−1/2∑T
t=1 g4t (θ) /
∑T
t=1 w
G2
t (α, hT ) = Op (1). With such a mixture of sample moments con-
verging at various rates, the standard asymptotic theory of GMM is inapplicable. Fortunately,
Gagliardini et al. (2011) and Antoine and Renault (2012) have developed XMM, an extension of
GMM, to explicitly incorporate moments with different rates of convergence. This latest method-
ological advancement makes the following empirical estimation possible.
We implement XMM by the continuous updating estimator (CUE) (Hansen et al., 1996). Let
gj (θ) = T
−1∑T
t=1 gjt (θ) be the simple sample average of (gjt (θ))
T
t=1. Define the CUE criterion
function as
J (θ) = Tg′ (θ) Ω̂−1 (θ)g (θ) ,
where g (θ) =
(
gj (θ)
)8
j=1
, and Ω̂ (θ) is the sample long-run variance of (gt (θ))
T
t=1. CUE automates
the choice of the weighting matrix so that we do not have to track the rate of each sample moment,
and the scaling factors in the unconditional moments, 1/
∑T
t=1 w
G1
t (hT ) and 1/
∑T
t=1 w
G2
t (α, hT ),
are also canceled out in Ω̂ (θ).
We denote the XMM estimator as4
θ̂XMM = argmin
θ∈Θ
J (θ) . (6)
Under regularity assumptions (see Gagliardini et al. (2011, p.1203) or Antoine and Renault (2012,
Theorem 4.3)), if hT → 0, hT
√
T →∞ as T →∞, we have
√
T
(
θ̂XMM − θ0
)
d→ N (0,Σ) , (7)
where Σ is the asymptotic variance and it can be consistently estimated by
Σ̂ =
[(
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂
∂θ
g′t (θ)
)
Ω̂−1 (θ)
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂
∂θ′
gt (θ)
)]−1 ∣∣
θ=θ̂XMM
.
Regarding the model specification test, Antoine and Renault (2012, Theorem 4.4) prove that this J-
statistic still follows the usual χ2 distribution. With eight moments and four unknown parameters,
the degrees of freedom of the χ2 distribution is 4.
3.4 Implementation
We use Robert Shiller’s S&P 500 dataset to construct the price and the fundamental (Download-
able at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm). The raw time series pT is taken as the
monthly average of the daily closing prices, and µT is calculated as the present value of all monthly
dividend flows according to the Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1959).
4 While standard kernel weight only depends on hT , here w
G2
t (α, hT ) also depends on α. In Appendix Section B
we explain that it does not affect the asymptotic distribution of θ̂XMM.
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Our discussion of the econometric procedure leaves open several choices in the implementation.
We discuss these issues one by one. The observed return and the fundamental time series both
exhibit upward trends. We have to filter the trends so that we can focus on the fluctuation of the
stationary time series. Detrending does not change the behavior of the investors as the growth
trend is incorporated in their decision of the quantity they purchase and the strategy they take. For
simplicity, we fit a linear trend for each time series and then detrend. We find that the difference
in the two trends is very small, which supports the implication of the efficient market hypothesis
that the growth rate of µT and pT converge in the long run. We observe that detrending in our
data preserves the pattern of over- and under-pricing periods as the crossing points of the two raw
time series are proximate before and after detrending. Moreover, for the chartist strategy we need
a reference price preft−1. We use a simple 12-month moving average rule p
ref
t−1 =
1
12
∑t−1
s=t−12 ps.
We have assumed that the density function of Λ to be symmetric and its support is the real
line. Many distributions satisfy these conditions, for example the standard normal, the hyper-
bolic secant distribution, the Logistic distribution, the Laplace distribution, and the t-distributions
of degrees of freedom at least 3 (with their variance standardized as 1). While εit is unobserv-
able, data provides no guidance about the choice of Λ. We select Λ as the standard normal for
its theoretical and practical attractiveness. Firstly, under normality the truncated mean function
ϕ (a) = − (2pi)−1/2 exp (−a2/2) is the (minus) density function of N (0, 1), which is a built-in func-
tion in all modern statistical programming languages. Secondly, the normal distribution is favorable
in justifying the conditional expectation of µt in the fundamental strategy. Given µt−1 and xit, if
the fundamentalist takes a prior distribution εµt ∼ N (0, 1), she will attain the posterior distribu-
tion µt| (µt−1, xit) ∼ N
(
µt−1+αxit
1+α ,
σ2µ
1+α
)
, which delivers exactly the weighted average rule for the
fundamentalist’s expectation of µt.
Throughout this paper, we use the same set of tuning parameters for all estimation proce-
dures and sample periods. The bandwidth hT in the kernel-weighted sample moments is set as
1.06σ̂∆T
−1/5 according to Silverman (1986)’s rule of thumb, where σ̂∆ is the sample standard de-
viation of (∆t)
T
t=1. The long-run variance is estimated using the Bartlett kernel (Newey and West,
1987); the number of lags in the kernel is chosen as 1.14
⌊
T 1/3
⌋
where ⌊·⌋ = maxb∈N {b ≤ ·}, with
the constant and the rate recommended in Andrews (1991). The rates of these tuning parameters
satisfy the requirement for the asymptotic normality, and the estimates are stable in a reasonable
range.
When applying XMM to the data, we set the compact parameter spaceΘ as [0.001, 3]3×[0.001, 6],
which is sufficiently wide for θ. We must deal with the local optimizers in general nonlinear pro-
gramming. We try many initial values to enhance the probability of capturing the global minimizer.
The initial value for σµ is always the sample mean of (ε
µ
t = µt − µt−1)Tt=1. This sample mean is a
consistent estimator, although in theory it is not as efficient as the XMM estimator since it does
not incorporate the information provided by the other moments. For the other three parameters
(η, τ, α), the initial value is independently drawn from the uniform distribution over their parame-
ter space. Given a randomly generated initial value, we carry out the nonlinear optimization. We
repeat such optimization for 100 times, save each local minimum, and take the smallest one as the
global minimum.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report the empirical results and compare them with alternative specifications.
We first estimate the parameters with a recent time span from January, 1991 to December, 2013,
to which we refer as Period 1. We then repeat the estimation procedure for two alternative time
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spans: January, 1961—December, 1990 (Period 2 ), and January, 1911—December, 1960 (Period 3 )
for robustness check.
In Section 4.1, all the eight moments are incorporated in the estimation, to which we refer as
the full model. Furthermore, we evaluate the effect of the kernel-weighted moments in Section 4.2,
and the mixture of the two strategies in Section 4.3.
4.1 Results from XMM
The time series of the linearly-detrended price pT and fundamental value µT in Period 1 are shown
in the upper panel of Figure 1. It is apparent that the price is more volatile than the fundamental.
The price sometimes deviates significantly away from the fundamental value, which corresponds to
boom-bust episodes in the financial history. In the long run, the price tracks the fundamental value
in general, which supports the market efficiency theory in a long-term perspective.
We take XMM as our benchmark. We report the XMM estimates of θ = (σµ, η, τ, α) and the
two-sided 95% asymptotic confidence intervals in Table 1 for each sample period. All estimates
are positive and none of the confidence intervals contains 0, which is consistent with the economic
interpretation of these parameters.
The parameters η and τ represent the trading intensity of the fundamental strategy and the
chartist strategy, respectively. Based on the estimation results of Period 1, the estimate of η means
that raising the expected return of the fundamental strategy by 1% increases the investment flow
by 0.10% on average. On the other hand, the estimate of τ implies that 1% change in the expected
return of the chartist strategy leads to a 0.61% hike in the investment flow. The estimate of α is
1.71 suggests that investors update their expected fundamental value aggressively by overweighing
the private information relative to the common prior on the historical fundamental value, as the
private information is more precise than the public information. In terms of the model specification
test, the J-statistic is 2.22 with the p-value 0.70. It does not reject the model, indicating that our
model can be a reasonable description of the data generating process for this sample period.
Table 1: Estimation Results of XMM for the Full Model
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. 95% CI est. 95% CI est. 95% CI
σµ 0.014 (0.008, 0.020) 0.007 (0.006, 0.008) 0.030 (0.024, 0.037)
η 0.102 (0.073, 0.131) 0.171 (0.141, 0.202) 0.224 (0.170, 0.277)
τ 0.612 (0.390, 0.835) 0.758 (0.607, 0.908) 1.099 (0.794, 1.405)
α 1.713 (0.688, 2.739) 2.021 (1.127, 2.915) 3.894 (2.401, 5.387)
J -stat. 2.222 7.202 7.471
p-value (0.695) (0.126) (0.113)
Note: Each column represents the sample period for estimation, where Period 1 is January,
1991—December, 2013, Period 2 is January, 1961—December, 1990, and Period 3 is January,
1911—December, 1960. For each sample period, this table displays the point estimates (est.) of the four
structural parameters and the 95% asymptotic confidence intervals (95% CI). The J-statistic (J-stat.) of
the over-identification test and the corresponding p-value are also reported. Under the null hypothesis of
correct moment specification, the J-statistics asymptotically follows χ2 (4). Tables 3 and 4 below follow the
same format.
Besides the values of the structural parameters, we are also interested in the endogenous switch-
ing of the financial agents between the chartist and fundamental strategies. It is illustrated in the
11
Figure 1: Data, Switching, and Fitting: Period 1 (January, 1991–December, 2013)
Note: (i) The upper panel shows the linearly detrended price pT and fundamental value µT . (ii) The
middle panel displays the fraction of chartists according to the full model, computed as mt(θ̂XMM). (iii) The
lower panel plots the ECDF of the real time series Rr
t
, t = 1, . . . , T , and that of the predicted Rt(θ̂XMM),
t = 1, . . . , T . Figures 2 and 3 below follow the same format.
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middle panel of Figure 1. Consistent with the model’s prediction, the market is dominated by fun-
damentalists when the asset is excessively mispriced, and by chartists when the price moves more
closely around the fundamental value. How agents switched between the heterogeneous strategies
during the recent global financial crisis is of particular interest. When the market was booming
during 2005–2007, many agents clustered to be chartists, who traded on price trends. When the
trend was reversed in late 2007, the market fraction of chartists declined sharply. Fundamentalists
prevailed the market in 2008–2009, the most volatile years during the global financial crisis. In that
episode, financial assets were overwhelmingly underpriced (as illustrated in the upper panel of Fig-
ure 1), and fundamentalists had accumulated strong buying force that drove the price up toward its
fundamental value. However, the price may not converge to the fundamental value immediately after
the fundamentalists occupy the market. The presence of information friction produces such inertia
in our model. No similar patterns of switching was found during the dot-com crisis. In the early
period of dot-com bubble formation, chartists dominated the market. As the asset became more
and more overpriced, agents switched to fundamentalists. The bubble continued to grow even after
fundamentalists fully occupied the market. In a highly noisy environment, some fundamentalists
might wrongly extrapolate the asset to be underpriced even if it was actually overpriced.
Table 2: Sample Moments of Real Return and Fitted Return
Mean Stan. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Real return 0.000 0.037 -1.380 9.280
XMM full model 0.002 0.036 -0.918 6.550
Period 1 GMM 0.001 0.036 -1.180 9.020
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.000 0.029 -0.291 2.460
XMM chartist-only 0.000 0.089 -1.450 5.990
Real return 0.000 0.036 -0.786 4.970
XMM full model 0.000 0.041 -0.214 4.340
Period 2 GMM -0.001 0.037 -0.435 5.090
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.000 0.028 0.261 2.330
XMM chartist-only 0.000 0.107 -0.670 3.310
Real return 0.000 0.051 -0.175 15.300
XMM full model 0.002 0.060 -0.494 11.500
Period 3 GMM 0.001 0.050 -0.177 13.200
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.000 0.038 0.347 2.810
XMM chartist-only 0.000 0.141 -1.130 6.680
Note: This table displays the mean, standard deviation (Stan. Dev.), and the standardized skewness and
kurtosis of the real returns and the predicted returns. For a sample x1, . . . , xT , the standardized skewness
and kurtosis here are respectively computed as σ̂−3T−1
∑
T
t=1
(xt − x¯)3 and σ̂−4T−1
∑
T
t=1
(xt − x¯)4, where
x¯ and σ̂ are the sample mean and standard deviation. In each period, the moments of the real returns are
computed from the observed time series Rr
t
, t = 1, . . . , T , while the other rows are calculated from Rt(θ̂),
t = 1, . . . , T , where θ̂ is the corresponding estimate.
To examine the performance of moment matching, we plug in the estimated parameters into the
model to predict the return. In the lower panel of Figure 1, the solid line is the empirical cumulative
distribution function (ECDF) of the real data (Rrt)
T
t=1, and the dashed line is the ECDF of the fitted
return series
(
Rt
(
θ̂XMM
))T
t=1
. The two ECDF curves closely track each other. As shown in the
upper panel of Table 2, the predicted returns generated from XMM have a mean return close to
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zero, a variance around 0.04, a negative skewness, and a kurtosis that is larger than 3. These sample
moments are similar to those of the real return series.
Next, we repeat the same exercises for other sample periods to check the robustness of the
empirical results. Figure 2 and the second column in Table 1 display the results of Period 2. Again,
the J-statistic does not reject the model specification. The estimated coefficients are comparable
with those in Period 1. The fitted returns match well with the real data in terms of ECDF and
the four moments, as shown in the middle panel of Table 2. Moreover, consistent with the previous
results, we observe from the middle panel of Figure 2 that chartists prevailed when the asset was
moderately priced, for example in 1976, while fundamentalists dominated the market when the price
deviated significantly away from the fundamental, for example in 1978–1982.
Figure 3 and the third column of Table 1 report the results for Period 3, a half century that
witnessed the Great Depression. The high volatility in this era is manifest as shown in Table 2,
with a kurtosis of 15.30 in the real return, the largest among the three sample periods. In terms of
the point estimates, the scale of the estimated coefficients τ and η are larger than those reported in
the other two periods, showing that both fundamentalists and chartists responded more sensitively
to the expected returns. The estimated coefficient α in Period 3 is about twice as large as that
in Period 1 or 2, suggesting fundamentalists updated information more aggressively in response to
the volatile market. In Figure 3 we again observe the switching from chartists to fundamentalists
when the asset was excessively mispriced and from fundamentalists to chartists when the asset was
moderately mispriced.
In the following sections, we estimate some simple alternative models and compare the empirical
results with those discussed in this section.
4.2 Estimation with Unconditional Moments Only: GMM
The standard GMM utilizes only the unconditional moments in estimation. For comparison, we
implement GMM (CUE) with the moment functions {gjt (θ)}j=1,5,6,7,8, and the results are reported
in Table 3. Ignoring {gjt (θ)}j=2,3,4, which contains information from the theoretical model, weakens
the asymptotic efficiency of parameter estimation. In our context, such efficiency loss is reflected
in the confidence intervals—in most cases the confidence intervals of the GMM estimator are wider
than their XMM counterparts. In particular, the confidence interval of η includes 0, which is highly
undesirable since the identification of the parameters relies on a positive η. In contrast, when
conditional moments are accounted for, the confidence intervals of η are clearly deviated away from
0 (see Table 1). In the meantime, with fewer restrictions GMM improves the in-sample fitting. The
model emulates the data more closely in terms of moment matching, as shown in Table 2 with the
kurtosis of the predicted return closer to that of the real data.
4.3 Estimation with a Solo Strategy
A common feature of the strategy switching in Figure 1–3 is that fundamentalists dominate the
market more frequently than chartists. This observation raises the question of the necessity of
introducing the two investment strategies to characterize the price movement. This section explores
whether a solo-strategy model is sufficient to capture the price dynamics.
The fundamentalist-only model is a sub-model of the two-strategy benchmark model. When
τ = 0 and η > 0, the chartist strategy generates zero profit so that no investor will adopt it. The
predicted return of the fundamentalist-only model follows (4). Since the kernel-weighted moment
functions gjt (θ) , j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, remain valid in the sub-model, we estimate the parameters (σµ, η, α)
by XMM with the same eight moments as in (6) but setting τ = 0. With the restriction τ = 0, the
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Figure 2: Data, Switching, and Fitting: Period 2 (January, 1961–December, 1990)
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Figure 3: Data, Switching, and Fitting: Period 3 (January, 1910–December, 1960)
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Table 3: Estimation Results of GMM with the Unconditional Moments
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. 95% CI est. 95% CI est. 95% CI
σµ 0.014 (0.010, 0.019) 0.002 (-0.333, 0.337) 0.029 (0.023, 0.036)
η 0.109 (-0.020, 0.238) 0.055 (-0.220, 0.330) 0.280 (-0.061, 0.621)
τ 0.676 (0.359, 0.992) 0.702 (0.502, 0.902) 0.685 (-0.028, 1.398)
α 2.513 (0.613, 4.413) 3.363 (1.405, 5.321) 2.765 (0.823, 4.707)
J -stat. 0.035 0.082 0.066
p-value (0.852) (0.774) (0.797)
Note: Similar to Table 1, this table displays the point estimates (est.) and the 95% asymptotic confidence
intervals (95% CI) for each sample period. Since only the unconditional moments are used in the
estimation, the J-statistics of the over-identification test follows χ2 (1) asymptotic distribution under the
null.
J-statistic follows χ2 (5) asymptotically under the null.
We report the empirical results in the upper panel of Table 4. The estimates stay positive and
statistically significant as the 95% confidence intervals are all above 0. This is consistent with the
results from the full model and provides evidence of the presence of the fundamentalist trading in
the market. Under the null hypothesis that the fundamentalist-only model is correctly specified,
the J-statistics are 15.74, 16.44 and 32.15 in Period 1–3, respectively, which are associated with
p-value less than 1%. The strong rejection means that the fundamental strategy solely is incapable
of mimicking the observed price movements. Moreover, in Table 2 the moments of fitted returns
are far away from the real ones. In particular, the fitted kurtosis is less than 3 throughout the three
sample periods, which contradicts the fat-tail phenomenon observed in the real data.
Table 4: Estimation Results of the Solo Strategy Models
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. 95% CI est. 95% CI est. 95% CI
Fundamentalist-only
σµ 0.015 (0.010, 0.020) 0.007 (0.006, 0.008) 0.030 (0.024, 0.036)
η 0.084 (0.060, 0.108) 0.157 (0.125, 0.189) 0.182 (0.130, 0.233)
α 0.612 (0.378, 0.846) 1.178 (0.826, 1.530) 1.239 (0.797, 1.682)
J -stat. 15.740 16.442 32.151
p-value (0.008) (0.006) (0.000)
Chartist-only
σµ 0.009 (0.002, 0.016) 0.007 (0.006, 0.008) 0.023 (0.016, 0.031)
τ 0.871 (0.792, 0.949) 1.179 (1.071, 1.286) 1.052 (0.944, 1.161)
J -stat. 37.697 94.914 44.639
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Under the null hypothesis, the J-statistic of the fundamentalist-only model follows χ2 (5) asymptotic
distribution, and that of the chartist-only model is χ2 (4) asymptotically. The corresponding p-values are so
small that the over-identification tests are rejected in all cases at 1% size.
If the fundamentalist-only model is insufficient to capture the real return, how about the chartist-
17
only model? The lower panel of Table 4 displays the XMM estimation results across the three sample
periods.5 The J-statistics clearly reject the chartist-only model at any commonly used test size,
and the moment matching in Table 2 is poorer than the full model.
In view of the empirical results, neither the fundamentalist strategy nor the chartist strategy
alone reasonably matches the data. The mixture of the two trading strategies is effective in improv-
ing the model fitting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a structural asset pricing model with information-driven behavioral hetero-
geneity. For this highly nonlinear model, we formally identify the structural parameters via thin-set
identification. The thin-set identification and the follow-up estimation techniques are applicable to
other heterogeneous agent models involving a mixture of investment strategies.
We estimate the parameters by XMM, and conduct inference for the model specification. The
empirical results show that the structural model emulates the S&P 500 index. Investors switch
between the fundamental and chartist strategies evolutionarily in response to the dynamic market
conditions. Agents tend to cluster toward the chartist strategy when the market environment waxes
and wanes, and their collective trading actions cause substantial asset mispricing that sometimes
turn into bubbles and crashes. However, when the asset is significantly overpriced or underpriced,
agents tend to revert to the fundamental strategy, which corrects the mispricing and restores the
market efficiency. The switching is found to be crucial for the empirical fitness of the structural
model. Models with only one strategy significantly underperform the structural model in terms of
matching the real price movement.
In this Appendix of this paper, we present the step-by-step development of the structural model
as well as the derivation of some technical claims in the main text. Moreover, we provide an Online
Supplement for additional empirical results, extension, and implementation.
5A formal test of the chartist-only model is more complicated than the fundamentalist-only model because the full
model precludes η = 0 due to its presence in the denominator in ζt−1. The implementation is detailed in Supplement
Section S2.
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Appendix
A Complete Description of the Structural Model
This section describes the information-based structural model, summarized in Section 2, step by
step.
A.1 Investment Strategies
In each period, the f -advisor updates the expected mean of µt after learning the private information
xit from the agent i. She follows a weighted average rule
Efit−1 [µt] =
µt−1/σ2µ + xit/σ2x
1/σ2µ + 1/σ
2
x
=
µt−1 + αxit
1 + α
,
where the weight is the information precision (the inverse of variance), α = σ2µ/σ
2
x is the precision
of private information relative to public information, and Efit−1 [·] = E
[·|xit,pt−1,µt−1] is the
expectation of the f -advisor conditional on the past public information as well as the private signal
xit. She believes in the efficient market hypothesis under which the price tracks the fundamental
value. Let her perceived return be Rft = p
f
t − pt−1, where pft is the perceived price to be realized in
time t. She expects the period-t return to be
Efit−1
[
Rft
]
= Efit−1
[
pft
]
− pt−1 = Efit−1 [µt]− pt−1 =
µt−1 + αxit
1 + α
− pt−1 = ασx
1 + α
(εit − δt) ,
where the second equality is implies by the efficient market hypothesis, and the last equality by the
definitions of xit and δt.
The c-advisor, on the other hand, employs technical analysis to forecast the price movements.
She ignores the private information xit and the fundamental µ
t−1, even though they are accessible.
Let Ect−1 [·] = Ec
[·|pt−1] be the c-advisor’s expectation conditional on past prices. The c-advisor
believes that the past price trend captured by ∆t−1 would persist in the following period. Let pct be
the chartist’s perceived price to be realized at time t, and Rct = p
c
t − pt−1 be the perceived return.
Her expected period-t return is
Ect−1 [R
c
t ] = E
c
t−1
[
pct |pt−1
]− pt−1 = ∆t−1.
Let f -advisor’s expected utility Ef [U ] = − exp
(
−Af
(
µW − Af2 σ2W
))
, where µW = E [W ] and
σ2W = var [W ] is the mean and variance of the wealth W , respectively, and A
f > 0 is a constant.6
Maximizing this utility is essentially maximizing µW − Af2 σ2W , the difference between the mean and
the variance multiplied by a constant.
Given the dynamics of wealth growthWit =Wit−1+q
f
itRt, we apply the expected utility function
6Such a functional form can be formally derived under the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) exponential
utility function U = − exp
(
−Af ·W
)
, where Af > 0 is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, and W ∼ N
(
µ, σ2
)
is
normally distributed. Such a CARA utility function takes into account the trade-off between risk and return and it
facilitates mean-variance analysis. It is widely used in the literature, for example Barberis et al. (ming).
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to the f -advisor at the beginning of time t:
Efit−1 [Uit] = − exp
(
−Af
(
Wit−1 + q
f
itE
f
it−1[R
f
t ]−
Af
2
(
qfit
)2
varfit−1[R
f
t ]
))
.
The f -advisor who maximizes the expected utility recommends the optimal investment flow
qf∗it = E
f
it−1[R
f
t ]/
(
Af · varfit−1[Rft ]
)
= η
ασx
1 + α
(εit − δt) , (8)
where η = 1/
(
Af · varfit−1[Rft ]
)
. We assume that varfit−1[R
f
t ] is a constant independent of i
and t. Similar expected utility analysis applies to the c-advisor, whose expected utility Ec [U ] =
− exp (−Ac (µW − Ac2 σ2W )). As a result, the c-advisor recommends the optimal investment flow
qc∗t = E
c
t−1 [R
c
t ] /
(
Ac · varct−1 [Rct ]
)
= τ∆t−1, (9)
where τ = 1/
(
Ac · varct−1 [Rct ]
)
as varct−1 [R
c
t ] is assumed to be a constant.
Both the conditional variances of the return are assumed time-invariant for the following rea-
sons.7 (i) The traders follow naive investment rules so that their perceived Rft and R
c
t are not
directly observable and the conditional variance cannot be estimated from the data. In such a
setup, the constant conditional variance is a convenient assumption following the literature, for
example Brock and Hommes (1998, p.1239) and Barberis et al. (ming, p.32), among many others
cited in this paper. (ii) The constant conditional variance allows us to derive a simple explicit form
for the price dynamics, which simplifies the estimation.
A.2 Choice of Strategies and Aggregation of Demand
Financial advisors advocate optimal investment flows qf∗it and q
c∗
t based on their independent anal-
ysis. Each agent is well informed of both strategies as well as the rationale behind (8) and (9). The
agent takes only one of the two strategies. The expected profit from a strategy is the product of
the expected return and investment flow, i.e.,
pifit = q
f∗
it
ασx
1 + α
(εit − δt) = η
(
ασx
1 + α
(εit − δt)
)2
for the fundamental strategy, and
pict = q
c∗
t ∆t−1 = τ∆
2
t−1
for the chartist strategy. The agent prioritizes investment profitability and chooses the strategy
that yields a higher expected profit. Let ε¯t be the threshold such that pi
f
it = pi
c
t when εit = ε¯t. We
solve η
(
ασx
1+α (ε¯t − δt)
)2
= τ∆2t−1 to obtain
ε¯t = δt ± 1 + α
ασx
√
τ
η
|∆t−1| = δt ± ζt−1,
and the lower bound ε¯mt = δt − ζt−1 and upper bound ε¯Mt = δt + ζt−1 follow.
7In Supplement Section S4, we discuss the possibility of extending the theoretical model to allow individual-
and/or time-varying conditional variances and its implications to identification and estimation.
20
Since pifit is a convex function of εit while pi
c
t is independent of εit, we have pi
f
it < pi
c
t if εit ∈
(ε¯mt , ε¯
M
t ). The agent, who seeks to maximize her expected profit, acts on the chartist strategy if
εit ∈ (ε¯mt , ε¯Mt ), whereas she carries out the fundamental strategy otherwise. When pifit = pict , the
agent would be indifferent between the two strategies, in which case we assume she adopts the
fundamental strategy. As a result, the individual investment flow is
q∗it = q
f∗
it · 1
{
εit ∈ (−∞, ε¯mt ] ∪ [ε¯Mt ,∞)
}
+ qc∗t · 1
{
εit ∈ (ε¯mt , ε¯Mt )
}
, (10)
where 1 {·} is the indicator function.
In the market, the fraction of chartists is given by mt = Λ
(
ε¯Mt
) − Λ (ε¯mt ), and the fraction of
fundamentalists is 1 −mt. Conditional on the past information and µt, the aggregate demand of
all agents is
Dt (θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
q∗itdΛ (εit)
=
∫
(−∞,ε¯mt ]∪[ε¯Mt ,∞)
ηασx
1 + α
(εit − δt) dΛ (εit) + τmt∆t−1
=
ηασx
1 + α
(∫ ε¯mt
−∞
zdΛ (z) +
∫ ∞
ε¯Mt
zdΛ (z)− (1−mt) δt
)
+ τmt∆t−1
=
ηασx
1 + α
(
ϕ (ε¯mt ) +
∫ ∞
−∞
zdΛ (z)− ϕ (ε¯Mt )− (1−mt) δt)+ τmt∆t−1
=
ηασx
1 + α
(
ϕ (ε¯mt )− ϕ
(
ε¯Mt
)− (1−mt) δt)+ τmt∆t−1
where the second equality follows by the definition of q∗it in (10), and the last line follows by∫∞
−∞ zdΛ (z) = 0, the symmetry of Λ.
B Verification of Technical Results
In Section 2 we have claimed that if Λ is unimodal, then mt is strictly decreasing in |δt| ∈ (0,∞).
Here we verify this claim. When δt > 0, by the Leibniz integral rule
∂mt
∂δt
=
∂
∂δt
[Λ (δt + ζt−1)− Λ (δt − ζt−1)] = λ (δt + ζt−1)− λ (δt − ζt−1)
=
∫ δt+ζt−1
δt−ζt−1
∂λ (x)
∂x
dx =
∫ δt+ζt−1
δt
+
∫ δt
δt−ζt−1
∂λ (x)
∂x
dx,
where λ (x) = ∂Λ (x) /∂x is the probability density of Λ, and we assume λ (x) is differentiable. Since
λ is symmetric and unimodal, we have ∂λ(x)∂x
∣∣
x=y
+ ∂λ(x)∂x
∣∣
x=−y = 0 for y ∈ R and
∂λ(x)
∂x
∣∣
x=y
≤ 0 for
y ∈ (0,∞). Given a fixed ζt−1, if δt ∈ (0, ζt−1) we have
∂mt
∂δt
=
∫ δt+ζt−1
ζt−1−δt
+
∫ ζt−1−δt
0
+
∫ 0
δt−ζt−1
∂λ (x)
∂x
dx =
∫ δt+ζt−1
ζt−1−δt
∂λ (x)
∂x
dx ≤ 0;
and obviously, ∂mt/∂δt ≤ 0 for δt ∈ [ζt−1,∞). Parallel analysis applies when δt < 0.
In Section 3.1 we have claimed that under the event G2 we have Rt (θ) = ψ
(√
τ 1+αασx
√
η |∆t−1|
)
τ∆t−1.
Here we verify this claim. The event G2 implies δt = 0, under which we have ϕ (ε¯
m
t ) − ϕ
(
ε¯Mt
)
=
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ϕ (−ζt−1)− ϕ (ζt−1) = 0 since for any a ≥ 0,
ϕ (a) =
∫ a
−∞
zdΛ (z) =
∫ −a
−∞
+
∫ a
−a
zdΛ (z) = ϕ (−a) +
∫ a
−a
zdΛ (z) = ϕ (−a)
by the symmetry of the density of Λ around 0. The symmetry also implies mt = Λ(ζt−1) −
Λ (−ζt−1) = ψ (ζt−1). Thus Rt (θ) in (3) is reduced to
Rt (θ) = τmt∆t−1 = ψ (ζt−1) τ∆t−1
given ρ = 1 and δt = 0.
In Footnote 4 we have claimed that not knowing α in WG2t (α, hT ) has no asymptotic effect.
Given the definition of J (θ) with α in wG2t (α, hT ), under the regularity conditions we have J (θ0)
d→
χ2 (8). Now we consider the value of the criterion function evaluated any θ˜ on the boundary of a
T−1/2-neighborhood of θ0 so that ‖θ˜ − θ0‖ = cT−1/2, where c > 0 is some constant and ‖·‖ is the
L2-norm. θ˜ is a sequence of points on the parameter space that converges to θ0 at rate T
−1/2. A
Taylor expansion of g¯(θ˜) around g¯ (θ0) gives
J(θ˜) = T
(
g¯ (θ0) +
∂
∂θ′
g¯(θˇ)(θ˜ − θ0)
)′
Ω̂−1(θ˜)
(
g¯ (θ0) +
∂
∂θ′
g¯(θˇ)(θ˜ − θ0)
)
= J (θ0) + υ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜)
where θˇ lies on the line segment connecting θ˜ and θ0, and
υ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) = κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜)− 2T g¯(θ0)′Ω̂−1(θ˜) ∂
∂θ′
g¯(θˇ)(θ˜ − θ0) ≥ κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜)− 2J1/2(θ0, θ˜)κ1/2(θ0, θˇ, θ˜)
where the inequality follows the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and
κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) = T (θ˜ − θ0)′Σ̂(θˇ, θ˜)(θ˜ − θ0)
Σ̂(θˇ, θ˜) =
∂
∂θ
g¯(θˇ)′Ω̂−1(θ˜)
∂
∂θ′
g¯(θˇ)
J
(
θ0, θ˜
)
= T g¯(θ0)
′Ω̂−1(θ˜)g¯(θ0).
Since the non-random sequence θ˜ → θ0, we have J(θ0, θ˜) = J (θ0) + op (1). On the other hand,
κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) ≥ φmin
(
Σ̂(θˇ, θ˜)
)
T‖θ˜ − θ0‖2 = c · φmin
(
Σ̂(θˇ, θ˜)
)
where φmin (·) is the minimal eigenvalue of a matrix. Assume Pr
(
φmin
(
Σ̂ (θ0, θ0)
)
> φ
)
→ 1 for
some constant φ bounded away from 0, and then we have κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) ≥ φc− op (1) with probability
approaching one as T →∞. For any fixed constant c > 0, we have
lim inf
T→∞
Pr
(
4J
(
θ0, θ˜
)
< κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜)
)
> 0.
When 4J
(
θ0, θ˜
)
< κ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) occurs, we have υ(θ0, θˇ, θ˜) > 0 and J(θ˜) > J (θ0). This argument
rules out the possibility that θ̂XMM is asymptotic biased because, as the global minimizer of J (θ), it
cannot “live” on or outside of a neighborhood shrinking to θ0 at rate T
−1/2; otherwise there is always
positive probability that θ̂XMM violates the definition as an minimizer. Therefore, the effect of not
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knowing α in wG2 (α, hT ) does not cause asymptotic bias. Once we have the rate of convergence,
the asymptotic normality follows from the standard XMM.
This favorable result is driven by the one-step estimation, in which θ̂XMM’s convergence is
guaranteed by all the eight moments together in comparison to the ideal J (θ0) that is immune from
the unknown α in wG2 (α, hT ). In contrast, we do not “plug in” a first-step estimator of α̂
(1) into
wG2 (α, hT ) and proceed with a two-step estimator θ̂
(2), where the superscript (1) and (2) refer to
the first step and the second step. Such a two-step estimation method depends on the property of
α̂(1), which may cause asymptotic bias in θ̂(2).
References
Allen, H. and M. P. Taylor (1990). Charts, noise and fundamentals in the london foreign exchange
market. The Economic Journal 100 (400), 49–59.
Andrews, D. W. (1991). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix esti-
mation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , 817–858.
Antoine, B. and E. Renault (2012). Efficient minimum distance estimation with multiple rates of
convergence. Journal of Econometrics 170 (2), 350–367.
Barberis, N., R. Greenwood, L. Jin, and A. Shleifer (forthcoming). Extrapolation and bubbles.
Journal of Financial Economics. NBER Working Paper w21944.
Boswijk, H. P., C. H. Hommes, and S. Manzan (2007). Behavioral heterogeneity in stock prices.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (6), 1938–1970.
Brock, W. A. and C. H. Hommes (1998). Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple
asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22 (8), 1235–1274.
Chang, Y., Y. Choi, and J. Y. Park (2017). A new approach to model regime switching. Journal of
Econometrics 196 (1), 127–143.
Chen, J., A. M. Variyath, and B. Abraham (2008). Adjusted empirical likelihood and its properties.
Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 17 (2), 426–443.
Chiarella, C., X.-Z. He, W. Huang, and H. Zheng (2012). Estimating behavioural heterogeneity
under regime switching. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (3), 446–460.
Cont, R. (2001). Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and statistical issues. Quanti-
tative Finance 1 (2), 223–236.
Eichholtz, P., R. Huisman, and R. C. Zwinkels (2015). Fundamentals or trends? a long-term
perspective on house prices. Applied Economics 47 (10), 1050–1059.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2002). The equity premium. The Journal of Finance 57 (2), 637–659.
Fan, J. and Q. Yao (2003). Nonlinear Time Series: Nonparametric and Parametric Methods.
Springer.
Franke, R. and F. Westerhoff (2012). Structural stochastic volatility in asset pricing dynamics:
Estimation and model contest. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (8), 1193–1211.
23
Frijns, B., T. Lehnert, and R. C. Zwinkels (2010). Behavioral heterogeneity in the option market.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (11), 2273–2287.
Gagliardini, P., C. Gourieroux, and E. Renault (2011). Efficient derivative pricing by the extended
method of moments. Econometrica 79 (4), 1181–1232.
Gordon, M. J. (1959). Dividends, earnings, and stock prices. The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 99–105.
Gospodinov, N. and T. Otsu (2012). Local gmm estimation of time series models with conditional
moment restrictions. Journal of Econometrics 170 (2), 476–490.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and E. Renault (1993). Indirect inference. Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics 8, S85–S85.
Hamilton, J. D. (1989). A new approach to the economic analysis of nonstationary time series and
the business cycle. Econometrica 57 (2), 357–384.
Hansen, L., J. Heaton, and A. Yaron (1996). Finite-sample properties of some alternative gmm
estimators. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 14 (3), 262–280.
He, X.-Z. and F. H. Westerhoff (2005). Commodity markets, price limiters and speculative price
dynamics. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 29 (9), 1577–1596.
He, X.-Z. and H. Zheng (2016). Trading heterogeneity under information uncertainty. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 130, 64–80.
Hirshleifer, D. and A. V. Thakor (1992). Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt. Review
of Financial Studies 5 (3), 437–470.
Huang, W., H. Zheng, and W.-M. Chia (2010). Financial crises and interacting heterogeneous
agents. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (6), 1105–1122.
Jongen, R., W. F. Verschoor, C. C. Wolff, and R. C. Zwinkels (2012). Explaining dispersion in
foreign exchange expectations: A heterogeneous agent approach. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 36 (5), 719–735.
Khan, S. and E. Tamer (2010). Irregular identification, support conditions, and inverse weight
estimation. Econometrica 78 (6), 2021–2042.
Kim, C.-J. (1994). Dynamic linear models with markov-switching. Journal of Econometrics 60 (1-2),
1–22.
Kim, C.-J. and C. R. Nelson (1999). Has the us economy become more stable? a bayesian ap-
proach based on a markov-switching model of the business cycle. Review of Economics and
Statistics 81 (4), 608–616.
Kim, C.-J., J. Piger, and R. Startz (2008). Estimation of markov regime-switching regression models
with endogenous switching. Journal of Econometrics 143 (2), 263–273.
Kitamura, Y. (1997). Empirical likelihood methods with weakly dependent processes. The Annals
of Statistics 25 (5), 2084–2102.
24
Kleibergen, F. and R. Paap (2006). Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular value decom-
position. Journal of econometrics 133 (1), 97–126.
Komunjer, I. (2012). Global identification in nonlinear models with moment restrictions. Econo-
metric Theory 28 (4), 719–729.
Lewbel, A. (2016). The identification zoo—meanings of identification in econometrics. Working
paper, Boston University.
Lof, M. (2012). Heterogeneity in stock prices: A star model with multivariate transition function.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (12), 1845–1854.
Lux, T. (1995). Herd behaviour, bubbles and crashes. The Economic Journal , 881–896.
Newey, W. K. and D. McFadden (1994). Large sample estimation and hypothesis testing. Handbook
of Econometrics 4, 2111–2245.
Newey, W. K. and K. D. West (1987). A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55 (3), 703–708.
Qin, J. and J. Lawless (1994). Empirical likelihood and general estimating equations. The Annals
of Statistics 22, 300–325.
Rothenberg, T. J. (1971). Identification in parametric models. Econometrica 39 (3), 577–591.
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density estimation for statistics and data analysis, Volume 26. CRC
press.
Smith, R. J. (2007). Efficient information theoretic inference for conditional moment restrictions.
Journal of Econometrics 138 (2), 430–460.
Ter Ellen, S., W. F. Verschoor, and R. C. Zwinkels (2013). Dynamic expectation formation in the
foreign exchange market. Journal of International Money and Finance 37, 75–97.
Venkataraman, K. and A. C. Waisburd (2007). The value of the designated market maker. The
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42 (3), 735–758.
25
Online Supplement
Due to space limitation, we prepare this Online Supplement for robustness check, additional
empirical results, some implementation details, an extension of the model, and two more examples
of the heterogeneous agent model to which the technique of thin-set identification is applicable.
S2 Robustness Check: ELXM
Empirical likelihood (Qin and Lawless, 1994; Kitamura, 1997) is an alternative to GMM. It is natural
to design empirical likelihood with extended moments (ELXM) as a counterpart of extended method
of moments (XMM). To check the robustness of the estimation results across different methods, we
estimate the model with ELXM in this section. We first describe how to carry out ELXM.
If the observations are i.i.d., empirical likelihood (EL) is formulated as a constrained optimization
problem
max
θ∈Θ,(pit∈[0,1])Tt=1
T∑
t=1
log pit, subject to
T∑
t=1
pit = 1 and
T∑
t=1
pitgt (θ) = 0,
where pit is the probability assigned to the t-th observation. EL is known to be asymptotically
equivalent to GMM at the first order.
In time series, however, the blockwise EL (Kitamura, 1997) takes a distinctive scheme to account
for the temporal dependence. We propose (blockwise) ELXM for time series. Let BT be the block
size and S = ⌊T/BT ⌋ be the number of blocks. The blockwise moment function can be written as
g
(BT )
js (θ) =
1
BT
sBT∑
t=s(BT−1)+1
gjt (θ) , for s = 1, . . . , S; j = 1, . . . , 8
where the blockwise summation deals with time dependence. The primal problem of ELXM is
formulated as
max
θ∈Θ,(pis∈[0,1])Ss=1
S∑
s=1
log pis subject to
S∑
s=1
pis = 1 and
S∑
s=1
pisg
(BT )
s (θ) = 0, (S11)
where g
(BT )
s (θ) is the blockwise counterpart of gt (θ), and pis is the probability assigned to the s-th
block. We denote the maximizer of θ in (S11) as θ̂ELXM. ELXM is the adaption of XMM into
the EL framework. Stable results between ELXM and XMM would reinforce the robustness to the
numerical optimization procedure and the tuning parameters for time dependence.
As an extension of XMM, Gagliardini et al. (2011, pp.2109–2010) have discussed the asymptotic
distribution of XMM’s EL cousin. If BT →∞, BT /T 1/2 → 0 as T →∞ (Kitamura, 1997, Theorem
1(vii), p.2090), the asymptotic distribution of θ̂ELXM is equivalent to that of θ̂XMM. First-order
asymptotic equivalence further indicates that the likelihood ratio statistic
LR = 2
(
S log
(
1
S
)
−
S∑
s=1
log pis
)
d→ χ2 (4) ,
where (pis)
S
s=1 is the implied probability—the maximizer of the (pis)
S
s=1 part in the primal problem
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(S11). Therefore, ELXM estimator is asymptotic equivalent to XMM, and the likelihood ratio test
follows the same asymptotic distribution as that of the J test.
Table S5: Estimation Results of ELXM for the Full Model
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. 95% CI est. 95% CI est. 95% CI
σµ 0.013 (0.010, 0.017) 0.007 (0.006, 0.008) 0.028 (0.028, 0.029)
η 0.106 (0.087, 0.126) 0.167 (0.125, 0.210) 0.218 (0.126, 0.310)
τ 0.597 (0.430, 0.763) 0.706 (0.422, 0.989) 0.857 (0.415, 1.300)
α 1.551 (0.642, 2.461) 1.863 (0.946, 2.779) 3.240 (0.808, 5.673)
LR-stat. 4.205 5.121 8.684
p-value (0.379) (0.275) (0.069)
Note: Similar to Table 1, the likelihood ratio statistics (LR-stat.) of the over-identification test follows
χ2 (4) asymptotic distribution under the null.
The numerical implementation of ELXM is similar to the standard blockwise EL. We carry out
the numerical optimization in two steps: (i) solve pi in the inner step given a trial value θ, and (ii)
solve θ in the outer step. We optimize the convex primal problem in the inner loop, while the outer
step is a standard low-dimensional nonlinear optimization. We set BT equal to the number of lags
for the long-run variance calculation in XMM in Section 3.4 of the main text.
The ELXM estimation of the full model is reported in Table S5. The point estimates and the
confidence intervals are close to those of XMM. The point estimates also yield very similar predicted
moments as XMM in Table 2 and the switching between fundamentalists and chartists exhibits
similar patterns with those in Figures 1, 2, and 3, which we do not repeat here. Nevertheless, the
LR test statistics of Period 3 is 8.68, with a p-value of 0.07. The over-identification test rejects
the null hypothesis at 10% significance level. The evidence of marginal rejection echoes the big
J-statistic for Period 3 in Table 1 of the main text. It indicates that we must be cautious when
applying our model to a long time span with high volatility and potential structural changes.
For further comparison, we run the standard blockwise EL to estimate the model with uncon-
ditional moments, as we did for GMM. The results are displayed in Table S6. Again, we observe
the pattern of smaller η and wider confidence intervals, which echoes that in Table 3. We also
try ELXM for the solo-strategy models, in which we encounter the numerical problem of infeasible
constraints in all three periods. The infeasibility problem is well understood in the literature of EL
as strong evidence of model misspecification (Chen et al., 2008). Severe model misspecification is
manifest in the very small p-values in Table 4. The evidence from the ELXM and EL estimation
suggests robustness of the empirical results in the full model and the model with the unconditional
moments, as well as strong rejection of the solo-strategy models.
S3 Additional Empirical Results
In the main text, valid inference relies on several assumptions in the structural model. This section
presents additional empirical results to verify some assumptions.
Local identification. In the main text we have assumed local identification, following Gagliardini et al.
(2011) and Antoine and Renault (2012). Here we provide statistical evidence of local identification.
Local identification is equivalent to a full-rank Jacobian matrix. We use Kleibergen and Paap
(2006)’s reduced-rank test (KP test) to check the rank of the empirical Jacobian matrix Ĥunc (θ) =
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Table S6: Estimation Results of EL for the Unconditional Moment Model
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. 95% CI est. 95% CI est. 95% CI
σµ 0.014 (0.014, 0.015) 0.007 (0.007, 0.007) 0.029 (0.029, 0.030)
η 0.116 (0.007, 0.225) 0.126 (-0.218, 0.470) 0.060 (-0.004, 0.124)
τ 0.678 (0.439, 0.917) 0.625 (0.116, 1.133) 0.750 (0.421, 1.080)
α 2.644 (0.879, 4.408) 1.751 (-0.135, 3.636) 3.672 (2.200, 5.145)
LR-stat. 0.037 1.103 0.234
p-value (0.848) (0.294) (0.628)
Note: Similar to Table 3, the likelihood ratio statistic of the over-identification test follows χ2 (1)
asymptotic distribution under the null.
Table S7: KP Test Statistic and p-value
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
XMM 15.850 (0.000) 5.826 (0.054) 7.319 (0.026)
GMM 19.141 (0.000) 7.251 (0.027) 9.563 (0.008)
Note: The null hypothesis is that the rank of Ĥunc (θ) is 3. The p-value in the parenthesis is calculated
according to the asymptotic distribution χ2 (2).
∂
∂θ′gunc (θ), where gunc =
(
gj
)
j∈{1,5,...,8} is the vector of the 5 unconditional sample moments. The
data support a full rank Ĥunc (θ) if we can reject the null hypothesis that its rank is 3, 2, or 1. We
evaluate the rank of Ĥunc (θ) at either θ̂XMM or θ̂GMM. Table S7 reports the KP test statistics under
the null of rank 3. We have also conducted the same test under the null that the rank of Ĥunc (θ) is
2 or 1, respectively, and the rejection is overwhelming in all cases. The KP test provides evidence
of non-trivial local information from the unconditional moments.
Unit root test for µT . The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical value for the standard Dicky-Fuller test
are -2.58, -1.95, -1.62 respectively. This is a one-sided test that rejects the null of unit root behavior
if the test statistic is smaller than the critical value. We run the Dicky-Fuller test, and obtain the
test statistics 0.0702, 0.9672, and -0.4081 for Period 1, 2 and 3, respectively. These statistics are
in favor of the null hypothesis of the unit root. Formally, they do not reject the null of unit root
at 10% significance level, since none of the statistics are smaller than −1.62. What is more, the
positive statistics in period 1 and 2, which are associated with autoregressive coefficient estimates
of 1.0004 and 1.0024, respectively, may indicate possibly very weak explosive behavior.
Correlation. Table S8 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of the real return time series
(Rrt) and the predicted (Rt (θ)) evaluated at the various estimates. The entries of the first column
of Table S8 are small, indicating weak correlation between the real return and the predicted ones.
This is not surprising since we fit the moments of the marginal distribution of the returns, rather
than the temporal co-movements, to estimate the parameters.
Frequency of the event G1. The analysis of the thin-set identification starts from the event
G1 = {∆t−1 = 0}, and the convergence rate of the local moments depends on how often ∆t−1
fluctuates around 0. Figure S4 plots the series (∆t)
T
t=1 in all the time periods. We observe the curve
vacillates around 0 repeatedly, so that G1 is not a rare event.
Markov Switching. We conduct a simple Markov switching model in which we allow two
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Note: The gray shaded region is the 90% pointwise confidence interval constructed by the time series kernel
smoothing method (Fan and Yao, 2003, p.218). We use the Bartlett kernel with the same bandwidth as in
the main text.
Figure S4: (∆t)
T
t=1 in All the Three Periods
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Table S8: Correlation Coefficients of the Real and Predicted returns
Real
XMM
GMM
XMM
full fund.-only
XMM full model 0.047
Period 1 GMM 0.048 0.975
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.075 0.613 0.565
XMM chartist-only 0.165 0.279 0.281 -0.197
XMM full model 0.117
Period 2 GMM 0.127 0.949
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.092 0.582 0.484
XMM chartist-only 0.081 0.201 0.313 -0.374
XMM full model 0.112
Period 3 GMM 0.130 0.821
XMM fundamentalist-only 0.014 0.410 0.077
XMM chartist-only 0.151 0.173 0.473 -0.538
Note: the time series here are the same as those in Table 2. The the entries are pairwise correlation
coefficient.
Table S9: Two-regime Markov Switching Model
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Regime 1: Boom Intercept 0.183 0.017 0.148 0.008 -0.003 0.009
Slope -0.481 0.180 0.679 0.088 1.864 0.033
Regime 2: Bust Intercept -0.276 0.010 -0.198 0.011 -0.132 0.013
Slope -0.824 0.101 0.348 0.123 0.446 0.038
Transition Boom→Bust 0.018 0.020 0.025
Probability Bust→Boom 0.019 0.015 0.021
regimes for the intercept and the slope coefficient in the regression Rrt = intercept + slope × µt +
error term. We refer to the regime with greater intercept and slope coefficient as the boom regime
and the other as the bust regime. The boom regimes for sample period 1, 2 and 3 are shaded in
yellow color in the upper, middle and bottom panel of Figure S5, respectively.
The boom (bust) regimes correspond to the scenarios when the market price is rising (falling).
The probability for the market to transit from a boom to a bust ranges from 1.8% to 2.5%, which
implies that on average it takes 40 to 56 months for the price to reverse its trend. Similarly, the
probability for the market to transit from a bust to a boom is very low.
There are considerable overlap between the boom regimes identified by the Markov switching
model and the chartists-dominated regime uncovered from the structural model. It suggests that
our model based on the dynamic transition in the market fraction of chartists reasonably captures
the price movement.
Confidence interval of mt
(
θ̂XMM
)
. The fraction of the chartist, mt (θ0), is a nonlinear
function of pT and µT . In principle we can construct the pointwise confidence interval by the delta
method based on the asymptotic distribution of θ̂XMM. However, it is difficult to interpret when
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Note: The gray shaded region is the 90% pointwise confidence interval constructed by parametric bootstrap.
The yellow shaded region is the probability of the boom regime estimated from the two-regime Markov
switching model.
Figure S5: Fraction of Chartists and Markov Switching
31
the two-sided symmetric confidence interval goes beyond [0, 1], which occurred in our experiment.
To avoid such difficulty, we can use the parametric bootstrap if we are willing to impose the
normality assumption εµt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1). Let θ̂∗(b)XMM be a bootstrap estimator where the superscript
“(b)” indexes the instance of bootstrap replication, and m
∗(b)
t = mt
(
θ̂
∗(b)
XMM
)
is the plug-in bootstrap
estimator of the fraction. The parametric bootstrap is implemented as follows. We simulate a
sequence µT∗(b) =
(
µ
∗(b)
t
)T
t=1
where µ
∗(b)
t = µt−1 + σ̂µ,XMMε
µ∗(b)
t with ε
µ∗(b)
t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1). Given
the data
(
µT∗(b),pT
)
, we obtain the bootstrap estimator θ̂
∗(b)
XMM. Here we only bootstrap µ
T∗(b) since
the function Rt (θ) only depends on the
(
pt−1, pct−1, µt, µt−1
)
but not pt. After having θ̂
∗(b)
XMM, we
plug it into mt (θ) and get m
∗(b)
t . We repeat the bootstrap for 199 times, and compute the 5% and
95% sample quantiles of
(
m
∗(b)
t
)200
b=1
for each t as the lower and upper bounds of the 90% two-sided
pointwise confidence interval for mt (θ0).
The estimated pointwise bootstrap confidence interval is shown as the gray shaded region in
Figure S5. The confidence interval is very narrow most of the time, in particular when mt
(
θ̂XMM
)
is close to 0. Interestingly, along with the swings of the fraction of the chartists before the 2008
financial crisis, the uncertainty is manifest by the relatively wide confidence intervals.
S4 Implementation
S4.1 Gordon Growth Model
The original Gordon growth model is defined as µ˜ = dt(1 + κ)/(β − κ), where dt is the dividend
at period t, β is the discount rate and κ is the average growth rate of dividends. Fama and French
(2002) suggest that the Gordon growth model implies β = y¯ + κ, where y¯ is the average dividend
yield. We replace β by y¯ + κ and obtain µt = dt(1 + κ)/y¯.
S4.2 Chartist-Only Model
Unlike the fundamentalist-only model, the chartist-only model is not a sub-model of the benchmark
model, since η cannot be set as 0. Even if we treat τ/0 = ∞, or view the model as a sequence
of models with η → 0+, the three kernel-weighted moment functions still break down. When η
becomes arbitrarily small, the fundamental strategy will return infinitesimal profit. It violates the
assumption that the fundamental strategy beats the chartist strategy under arbitrarily deviation
from ∆t−1 = 0, and invalidates g2t (θ) and g3t (θ), which were justified by arguing that the market
is dominated by fundamentalists when G1 occurs. Moreover, as a chartist ignores the fundamental
value, α is also unidentified; thus g4t (θ) is not well defined.
Given the difficulty of adapting it to the chartist-only scenario, we slightly modify the benchmark
model. In a market with only chartists, the demand equation becomes Rt (θ) = τ∆t−1. Notice that
even without fundamentalists, the event G1 remains well defined. Thus we introduce another kernel-
weighted moment function
g9t (θ) = w
G1
t (hT ) (|Rrt| − τ |∆t−1|) ,
where G2 is replaced by G1. This conditional moment is implied by the chartist-only model: when
∆t−1 is close to 0, the return must also be small.
When estimating the chartist-only model, we utilize g9t (θ) along with the five unconditional
moment functions {gjt (θ)}j=1,5,6,7,8. The estimation involves six moments and two parameters
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(σµ, τ), so that the J-statistic still follows χ
2 (4) asymptotically under the null hypothesis.Extension
of the Model
S5 Extension of the Model
Homogeneity and time invariance of the conditional variance in returns is restrictive, especially
during a financial crisis. In this section, we discuss the possibility of relaxing this assumption.
We define ηit = 1/
(
Af · varfit−1[Rft ]
)
to allow varfit−1[R
f
t ] to vary across i and t. Similarly,
define τt = 1/
(
Ac · varct−1 [Rct ]
)
, which is time-varying but individual invariant as the chartist
strategy does not consider any private signal. It follows that for the fundamental strategy pifit =
ηit
(
ασx
1+α (εit − δt)
)2
, and for the chartist strategy pict = τt∆
2
t−1. The investor chooses the funda-
mental strategy if pifit ≥ pict , and the demand of the risky asset is
q∗it = q
f∗
it · 1
{
pifit ≥ pict
}
+ qf∗it · 1
{
pifit < pi
c
t
}
.
To compute the market aggregate demand, we need to specify the conditional variances since neither
varfit−1[R
f
t ] nor var
c
t−1 [R
c
t ] is observable from the data. A simple rule from the observed past history
is an option for the chartist, while there is no consensus in the literature about the conditional
variance of the fundamental strategy.
Consider imposing a parametric assumption on the joint distribution of (ηit, εit), for example,
jointly normal i.i.d. across time. This simple specification introduces two extra parameters: the vari-
ance of ηit that captures the dispersion of the beliefs on the volatility, and the correlation coefficient
between ηit and εit. Although the theoretical model can be simulated by the method of simulated
moments (MSM), all the closed-forms in the aggregate demand and the thin-set identification are
lost. Such difficulty arises even before we study any dynamic specification in (ηit), which will incur
additional parameters.
Analysis becomes more tractable if we assume that the distribution of ηit and εit are independent.
Let ε¯it be the threshold such that pi
f
it = pi
c
t . We solve ηit
(
ασx
1+α (ε¯it − δt)
)2
= τt∆
2
t−1 to obtain
ε¯it = δt ± 1 + α
ασx
√
τt
ηit
|∆t−1| = δt ± ζit−1,
where ζit−1 = 1+αασx
√
τt
ηit
|∆t−1|. Define the lower bound ε¯mit = δt − ζit−1 and upper bound ε¯Mit =
δt + ζit−1. As a result, the individual investment flow is
q∗it = q
f∗
it · 1
{
εit ∈ (−∞, ε¯mit ] ∪ [ε¯Mit ,∞)
}
+ qc∗t · 1
{
εit ∈ (ε¯mit , ε¯Mit )
}
.
The probability of individual i adopting the chartist strategy is mit = Λ
(
ε¯Mit
) − Λ (ε¯mit ), and the
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aggregate demand in the market is
Dt (θ) =
∫ 1
0
∫
(−∞,ε¯mit ]∪[ε¯Mit ,∞)
ηitασx
1 + α
(εit − δt) dΛ (εit) di+ τt∆t−1
∫ 1
0
mitdi
=
ασx
1 + α
(∫ 1
0
ηit
[∫ ε¯mit
−∞
zdΛ (z) +
∫ ∞
ε¯Mit
zdΛ (z)− (1−mit) δt
]
di
)
+ τt∆t−1
∫ 1
0
mitdi
=
ασx
1 + α
(∫ 1
0
ηit
[
ϕ (ε¯mit )− ϕ
(
ε¯Mit
)− (1−mit) δt] di)+ τt∆t−1 ∫ 1
0
mitdi. (S12)
If we further assume τt = τ/ε
c
t with ε
c
t being the proxy for var
c
t−1 [R
c
t ], we can pointly identify
τ under the event G2 as in the main text. This identified τ will depend on the choice of ε
c
t . On the
other hand, if we assume ηit = η/ε
v
it, where ε
v
it is the shock to each individual’s conditional variance
independent of all other random variables, then the identification of (η, α) remains under the event
G1. Therefore, in this generalized model in which we allow time-varying and heterogeneous ηit,
we are able to pointly identify the same parameter (η, α) as in the main text where a constant
varft−1
[
Rft
]
is assumed. As a result, the empirical estimates of (η, α) in the three periods in the
main text are informative about the magnitude of these parameters.
If we start with the general model, nevertheless, MSM will be necessary to handle the integrals∫ 1
0 ηit
[
ϕ (ε¯mit )− ϕ
(
ε¯Mit
)− (1−mit) δt] di and ∫ 10 mitdi in the demand equation (S12). We do not
have simple closed-forms for these integrals as εmit , ε
M
it and mit all depend on ηit and τt. Exploration
of the conditional variance in this heterogeneous agent model would contribute to the theoretical
modeling, asymptotic property of XMM-MSM, as well as the empirical findings. All these three
aspects are new to the existing literature and they deserve thorough investigation in future research.
S6 Examples of Thin-Set Identification
Thin-set identification is not peculiar to our model. It is also useful for other heterogeneous agent
models. Here we give two examples.
Example 1. Lux (1995) formalizes herd behavior in speculative markets in which bubbles emerge
as self-organizing process of infection among traders. Let x be an index ranging from −1 (extremely
pessimistic) to 1 (extremely optimistic). It characterizes the average opinion of speculative investors.
The dynamics of x is governed by the differential equation
dx/dt = 2v (tanh (ax)− x cosh (ax)) ,
where a is a measure of the strength of herd behavior, and v is a variable for the speed of change.
The fraction of optimistic trader is 0.5 (x+ 1) ∈ [0, 1] (Lux, 1995, pp.884–885). When x = 1, the
fraction of optimistic trader is 1.
Example 2. He and Westerhoff (2005) analyze the creation of bull or bear market via nonlin-
ear interactions between market participants—consumers, producers and heterogeneous specula-
tors—in a behavioral commodity market model. They model the market share of chartists as
1/
(
1 + d (F − St)2
)
, where d is a switching parameter, F is the long-run equilibrium price, and St
is the commodity price at time t (He and Westerhoff, 2005, p.1582). When F = St, the fraction of
chartists is 1.
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